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I. Introduction 
 
In “The Constraints of Hume’s Naturalism,”1 Barry Stroud takes on the task of looking at 
Hume’s negative and positive accounts of induction in conjunction. Stroud goes about 
doing this so that we might walk away with “a more general lesson about naturalism, at 
least when it is indulged in for philosophical purposes” (343, Emphasis added). Initially, 
we are wont to ask: what kind of naturalism does Stroud believe Hume to be 
investigating? As Hume’s titles to the Treatise and Enquiry suggest, he is seeking a 
justified explanation to human nature and/or understanding which seems to be grounded 
in inductive inference (explicated in Section II). In other words, Hume is trying to find a 
way around the problem of induction in regard to human nature without recourse to talk 
of perceptions and senses (Section III). Given the boldness of Stroud’s quote from above, 
there should be some explicit talk of this general lesson about naturalism outside of 
Hume’s, but there is none that is readily apparent. If a more general and philosophically 
motivated lesson about naturalism is to be gleaned from Stroud’s investigation of Hume, 
then we should take this to be a lesson implicit in Stroud and not Hume. Hence I shall 
argue that Stroud tacitly endorses the skeptical conclusions of David Hume about 
naturalism in general when indulged for philosophical purposes (Section IV). 
 
II. Naturalism, Induction, and Skepticism 
 
To understand Stroud’s critique of Hume, we need to show how the terms “naturalism,” 
“induction,” and “skepticism” are being used in Hume. Hence we must first acknowledge 
that naturalism is the overarching principle that becomes illuminated by what is called the 
problem of induction and the so-called skepticism that Hume reached because of this 
problem. Furthermore, all of these terms have consequences in epistemology, the area of 
philosophy concerned with knowledge. Very succinctly, questions of epistemology are 
those that are concerned with how we acquire and arrive at beliefs that count as 
knowledge. Hence it will be necessary to first explicate Hume’s problem of induction and 
the conclusion that his opponents have called skeptical. From there we should be able to 
see the naturalism that Hume endorses. 
 
Broadly speaking, induction is the process of arriving at a general conclusion from 
particular instances. The problem of induction in Humean terms2 is laid out as follows. 
First there are two kinds of propositions, “Relations of Ideas” (RoI) and “Matters of Fact” 
(MoF). Here is how we distinguish between these two kinds of propositions. RoIs are 
discoverable by mere creations of thought. For example, the proposition “2 + 2 = 4” 
expresses a truth and our knowledge of this truth is expressed in a belief that was attained 
by merely thinking about the abstract process which produces the conclusion that when 
we add “2” and “2” together we get ‘4.” RoIs also have the characteristic of being as such 
that when one expresses their contrary it implies a contradiction, e.g., “2 - 2 = 4” is a 
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contradiction. MoFs are those propositions that are found to be true by empirical research 
and whose contrary does not imply a contradiction. For example, we have the MoF that 
“All dogs are fat,” The contrary MoF “All dogs are skinny” does not imply a 
contradiction. To discover whether these MoFs are true or not, we go out and look at the 
world to see if all dogs are fat or skinny. In other words, the knowledge of MoFs comes 
from the world itself. Secondly, for every proposition Hume considers he asks whether it 
is a RoI or a MoF. If the proposition is a RoI, then no empirical research is necessary. If it 
is a MoF, then we need to do some empirical research. A good way to exemplify this is 
through the argument,  
Premise (1): In the past the sun has risen. 
Conclusion: Therefore, the sun will rise tomorrow. 
The contrary proposition of Premise (1), i.e., “In the past the sun has not risen,” does not 
imply a contradiction since part of our empirical research involves looking at a part of the 
world where the sun has not risen in the past, say, the Antarctic. However, since we are 
not in the Antarctic, we can localize Premise (1) for our purposes to a part of the world 
where in the past the sun has risen. To reach our conclusion, though, requires an implicit 
proposition. Let’s call it Premise (1a) which says, “The future will resemble the past.” 
When we put it into our argument it looks like this:  
Premise (1): In the past the sun has risen. 
Premise (1a): The future will resemble the past. 
Conclusion: Therefore, the sun will rise tomorrow. 
And this paints the picture of how we arrive at our understanding of the world through 
inductive inference, but how is this a problem and for whom is it a problem?  
 
It is a problem because we have knowledge of the past, but we have no knowledge 
whatsoever of what the future is like. Hume says that we reach our conclusions about 
MoFs through habit with the assumptions or expectations we make like those in Premise 
(1a). Saying that our knowledge of the world is acquired through habit is a problem for 
those of Hume’s time because they maintained that our knowledge of the world, that the 
future will be like the past, that objects persist in their continued existence when not 
being perceived, that there is cause and effect, and that there is uniformity in nature were 
founded on reason or something like RoIs (Cf. John Locke’s An Essay Concerning 
Human Understanding”). Furthermore, this is problem because all data and “knowledge” 
of the sciences, and of every human, is acquired in this way, which implies that science 
and human knowledge is not rational. Also, saying that our knowledge of the world is 
habitual puts humans on par with animals since animals display these inductive 
capabilities which is also a problem for philosophers like Locke who maintained that our 
rational capabilities set us apart and placed us above all creatures of the world. Hence 
Hume encourages us to give up normative epistemology which says roughly that our 
knowledge of the world ought to come to us through reason. 
 
When Hume follows induction to its philosophical end, he finds that it leads to an even 
more radical conclusion, that of skepticism, which is as follows: If reason does not justify 
our knowledge and understanding of the world, then we acquire our knowledge of the 
world exclusively through our sense perceptions. If we acquire our knowledge of the 
world exclusively through our sense perceptions, then we can only have knowledge of 
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those sense perceptions and only those perceptions. Therefore, we have no knowledge 
whatsoever of the external world, but of sense perceptions. What we are skeptical of, then, 
is that there is even an external world to be known or from which to gain knowledge. 
  
We are now to in position to see where Hume’s naturalism comes into the picture. Seeing 
that we are to give up on reason providing us with knowledge of the world, Hume says 
that the positive outcome of gaining knowledge of the world through habit is that it is 
perfectly natural for us to do so. If this is perfectly natural, then we can explicate MoFs, 
and hence the world, without having to make questionable metaphysical claims that an 
entity like God gives us the guarantee that we can be certain that our inductive inferences 
made from our sense perceptions give us knowledge of the external world. Bringing God 
or some other entity into the picture is to appeal to something that we cannot confirm by 
empirical research. 
 
III. Can Hume Get Past Induction Naturalistically? 
 
Barry Stroud introduces Kemp Smith’s work for the purpose of showing that Smith was 
perhaps the first to espouse the thesis that Hume’s naturalism could not be understood 
without his skeptical considerations (342). Rather, the idea is that Hume only reached his 
negative, skeptical conclusion to show that if a rigorous philosophical inquiry of 
induction reveals that “reason” does not justify one’s beliefs pertaining to the external 
world, then our beliefs must be justified naturalistically, i.e., explain mental phenomena 
as it is in nature without having to make any epistemic leaps of faith or positing a bloated 
ontology. Hence Hume wanted to reveal the weakness in Locke and other others who 
shared the belief that reason justified our experience and knowledge, especially since 
reason was thought to distinguish humans over and above all in the animal world (340). 
For this reason Stroud’s project comes in two parts. 
  
The first part consists in showing why Hume seeks a naturalistic explanation of human 
nature. Just as a student of animal nature will go out and observe how animals behave in 
their natural surroundings and record the findings, so too will a student of human nature 
go about studying other humans. Hume was well aware that the study of human nature in 
this way involved inductive inference. So, if any philosophical inquiry of human nature 
involved inductive inference, then the first constraint of Hume’s naturalism is the 
problem of induction, which means that the burden falls on Hume to show how induction 
is to be justified and explained. This first part of Stroud’s project shows that Hume’s 
naturalism (his positive account), then, consists in providing an account of human nature 
without appealing to induction, or as Stroud illuminates, “To put it in crude terms, it is a 
question of how human beings get, or what takes them, from input to output” (343). At 
this point Stroud shows that Hume’s detailed account begins with our initial, fleeting 
impressions, and then through other principles “the mind slides easily along a certain 
series of perceptions” treating our inductive beliefs as a “kind of fiction.” Ultimately, 
Stroud says that Hume hoped that these principles would be as such that “human beings 
with such limited experiences will universally and inevitably come to believe.” 
Furthermore, Hume gives us this account without any appeal “to the existence of. . . 
independently existing objects” (345). Hume thought that a combination of these 
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principles and nature would provide the justification for explaining how a student of 
human nature uses inductive inference. What this does instead is provide another 
constraint for Hume, which brings us to the second part of Stroud’s project. 
 
The second part is to use Hume’s “special embarrassments and dissatisfactions” to bring 
to light a lesson about Hume’s naturalism and naturalism in general (343). Since Hume’s 
account of the principles of the imagination were given without appeal to the existence of 
the external world, and since he claims the mind treats the external world as a fiction, 
experience has the consequence of being purely psychological, totally removed from 
nature. Thus, Stroud says, Hume’s account stands outside of nature so completely that it 
fails to be both naturalistic and explanatory. This means that Hume’s skeptical 
considerations are so strong that in trying to evade them his account of how the naturalist 
accounts for her beliefs is outside of the naturalist and even the rest of the world, 
especially since all perceptions are fictions (346). The lesson is this. Hume’s naturalism 
is not natural in the least. 
 
IV. Stroud’s Silent Skepticism 
 
However, Stroud also claims that the constraints of Hume’s naturalism will shed some 
light on the constraints of a naturalistic, philosophical inquiry of human nature in general. 
If we are to understand Stroud correctly, then Hume provided us with his skeptical 
argument for one reason. The reason is this: Once we push our philosophical 
investigations to their logical conclusions, we will be provided with the basis from which 
to begin a naturalistic account of the external world and the human mind, but the basis is 
shaky. Stroud shows that Hume’s naturalistic account for the persisting existence of the 
world and of human activity seems to exclude nature and is hence purely psychological. 
And if this is the case, then what Stroud has done was to show, by way of transitive 
property, that in spite of Hume’s own efforts, we can only reach the level of skepticism 
when regarding our epistemological beliefs about the external world and any attempts at 
explaining human understanding and the world naturalistically. Finding universal 
principles of the mind and/or imagination are virtually impossible since the student of 
human nature can only appeal to a deficient source of input that is heavily reliant on 
experience, which Stroud calls “the poverty of the input.” 
 
An obvious objection would be that Stroud is speaking of Hume’s naturalism exclusively 
and that I have no proof to raise such a conclusion. Since I maintain that Stroud is 
implicitly supporting a skeptical claim about naturalism in general, we must turn to 
Stroud’s own words. First, of inductive inference Stroud says that Hume’s project “is a 
completely general account of virtually all human belief in anything at all” (348). This 
point is perhaps better illustrated when Stroud says: 
What is true of the naturalistic study of both animals and human beings. . . is 
carried out in each case by human beings. That presents no difficulty. . . for 
whatever we find to be true of animals. But when human beings are both agents 
and objects of naturalistic study, what is found to be true of the objects studied 
must somehow also be understood to be true of those of us who conduct the study 
(348). 
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Here Stroud is laying down the framework for what a general naturalistic study of human 
and animal nature amounts to and what it is true of. Rightly, a naturalist would reject 
Hume’s naturalism, as Stroud points out. They would indulge in their inductive inference 
and carry on with their lives. However, we must remember that these skeptical worries 
only surface when “indulged for philosophical purposes.” This means that if we attempt 
to arrive at justifying naturalism in general philosophically, then we will inevitably meet 
a skeptical end. This is especially true since a naturalistic account of anything must 
invariably make reference to nature in order to have explanatory force or value. In other 
words, Stroud implicitly endorses the thesis that it is impossible for philosophers to give 
a justified naturalistic account of anything since justification is supposed to be justified 
by reason and so non-circular. 
 
The evidence that Stroud is speaking to philosophers exclusively comes from a parallel 
that he makes with Hume. Where Hume feels “philosophical melancholy and delirium” 
nature alleviates him from his skeptical worries and so he is able to dine, play a game of 
backgammon, and be merry with friends; we can do the same, and the “we” here changes 
context as Stroud’s parallel shows. The “we” Stroud is referring to are philosophers, for 
philosophers are the only ones who ultimately seek justification “in the right way” (350). 
The right way entails non-circular explanations. The philosopher, with all of her 
reductionist tendencies, seeks to avoid circularity. Any non-circular explanation of 
human nature would require that there be no reference to nature in thought, belief, or 
action. However, Stroud says that any “rich conception of nature. . . at least in general 
terms” should include “the whole world of enduring bodies in space and human bodies 
and human actions in interaction with them and with one another” (350). In a word, he is 
talking about empirical evidence. Furthermore, naturalism in general, and in the sense 
that a great many of us think of it today, is one where our explication and understanding 
of the world is completely consistent with the findings of science. Science proceeds from 
empirical evidence. Empirical evidence is rife with inductive inference, but it matters not 
to science if explanations deriving from empirical evidence are circular. Such evidence 
will suffice as a justified explanation, as knowledge. The implication is that philosophers 
are not able to provide such a naturalistic conception given their reductionist approach. 
Thus Hume’s skeptical considerations are always the undercurrent to any philosophically 
rigorous, naturalistic inquiry. 
 
V. Conclusion and Commentary 
 
Since Stroud’s project is to shed light on the general lesson about a philosophical 
investigation of naturalism through Hume, then it can be inferred that Stroud has re-
introduced the skeptical interpretation of Hume as conclusive as it pertains to 
philosophers only. Therefore, we can conclude that Stroud has effectively shown that any 
philosophically rigorous general account of naturalism about the external world is 
ultimately not justified since we will help ourselves to inductive inference without fail. In 
other words we are advised to look at Hume’s skeptical argument in conjunction with his 
naturalistic account only to see that any philosophical attempt at naturalism in general is 
still ultimately impossible, though Stroud chooses to remain evasively silent on the issue. 
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NOTES 
 
1. In Synthese (2006) 152:339–351. 
 
2. As is evidenced by his account in Treatise of Human Nature. 
